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This is a human factors study of single-pilot IFR flight in which a Flight Data Console presents 
ATC information through a simulated digital data link. The study was conducted for the NASA 
Langley Research Center under the direction of Dr. John D. Shaughnessy, Mr. Hugh P. Bergeron, 
and Mr. David Hinton. We would like to thank them profusely for their excellent suggestions and 
guidance. 
Mr. Donald Dawson, of K&W Electronics, and Mr. James H. Sanders, of BioTechnology, were 
instrumental in the design and fabrication of the Flight Data Console. Mr. Arthur Paul Barker, of 
BioTechnology, played a key role as inflight console operator. 
Finally, a particular note of appreciation must go to the subject pilots for their most important 
contributions: 
Allan E. Carr 
Catherine C. Connor 
John E. Dettra 
Sam Griffith 
Mike McDermott 
Julian Morrison 
Gregory 1. Schwob 
James H. Thornbro 
Kenneth R. Yenni 
iii 
This Page Intentionally Left Blank 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Aviation in the 1980s - The Vistas of Technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
General Aviation Safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
The General Aviation Flight Deck ............................................ 5 
Data Management and Information-Processing Qualities 
of the Human Operator .................................................. 7 
Conclusions ............................................................. 11 
PROJECT OBJECTIVES .... , ................ , ........... , ................... , 13 
Project Plan ............................................................. 14 
Study Problems of Data Management During General Aviation 
Single· Pilot IFR Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15 
Design and Construct a Cockpit Flight Data Console (FDC) ...................... 15 
Conduct an Inflight Study ............................. ,................... 15 
Prepare Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16 
PROCEDURES ............................................................. 17 
Record Instrument Approaches .............................................. 17 
Design and Construct a Flight Data Console. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 17 
Description. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 17 
Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21 
Conduct an Inflight Study .................................................. 23 
Simulator Pretest .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 23 
Aircraft Installation ..................................................... 23 
Subject Pilots ......................................................... , 24 
Evaluation Flights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24 
Standard Flight Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26 
Data Collection Procedures ............................................... 27 
RESUL TS AND CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 29 
Use of Copilot ........................................................... 29 
Objective Measures of Performance ........................................... 31 
Workload and Performance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 33 
v 
Table of Contents (continued) 
Page 
Safety and Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 36 
Acceptance Comments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 37 
Positive Comments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 37 
Negative Comments .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 38 
Air Traffic Control Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 38 
SUMMAR Y AND CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 40 
REFERENCES...... ............... .................... ....... ........ ...... 43 
APPENDICES ............... , ......................................... ,. .. .. 45 
Appendix A Preflight Questionnaire Data-Flight Experience of Subject Pilots. . . . . . . .. 47 
Appendix B Preflight Questionnaire Data-IFR Responses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 48 
Appendix C Workload Ratings by Subject Pilots at Completion of Each Flight. . . . . . . .. 49 
Appendix D Workload Rankings by Subject Pilots at Completion of All Flights ........ 50 
Appendix E Safety Rankings by Subject Pilots at Completion of All Flights. . . . . . . . . .. 51 
Appendix F Acceptance Rankings by Subject Pilots at Completion of All Flights. . . . . .. 52 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 53 
vi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
1 General aviation landing phase accidents 5 
2 Retention of ATC information under low and high 
information load conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 9 
3 Response delay as a function of speed and load stress .......................... 11 
4 Sample page showing log used for transcription of recorded 
instrument approach ................................................... 18 
5 Flight Data Console front seat installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19 
6 Principal components of Flight Data Console ................................. 20 
7 Features of pilot's display and keyboard .................................... 22 
8 Location of ancillary controls for the rear-seat FDC operator .................... 25 
9 Installation of rear-seat Flight Data Console .................................. 25 
10 Standard flight plan for evaluation flights .................................... 27 
11 Average workload ratings obtained after each flight ............................ 34 
12 Average workload rankings obtained following completion 
of all flights .......................................................... 34 
13 Judgments of flight performance by the safety pilot and by 
subject pilots following each flight ......................................... 35 
vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1 General Aviation Operations (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2 
2 General Aviation/Air Carrier Accident Rates .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4 
3 Crew Activities-Use of Copilot- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 30 
4 Descent Below Minimum Altitude ....................................... " 32 
5 Impact of DABS Data Link on Communications Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 39 
viii 
INTRODUCTION 
Aviation in the 1980s - The Vistas of Technology 
The history of civil aviation in America has been one of rapid growth, partly in response to an 
increasing population and partly as a result of an overwhelming increase in manufacturing capacity 
during World War II. The extent of this growth is shown in a comparison of operations over the two 
decades from 1958 to 1978. The airlines of the United States, in 1958, flew 39.5 million passengers 
on domestic routes, while another 4.2 million were carried in international service. A milestone also 
was achieved in this year when, for the first time, more people crossed the Atlantic from the United 
States by air than by steamship (Canby, 1963). By 1978, an amazing growth was seen. In this year, 
254 million passengers were carried within the United States and an additional 20.7 million on 
overseas routes. This is an increase of over 640 percent in our domestic air transport operations. 
The complexion of the national aviation system has changed a number of times during its 
growth, mainly to accommodate new procedures and equipment. The first air traffic control started 
at Newark, New Jersey, in 1935 to provide weather information to aircraft and also for limited 
guidance during terminal area operations. The feasibility of two-way radio installations made 
this possible. 
World War II produced many advances in aviation, a most important one being the use of radar 
to monitor the flight path of an aircraft. This military technology became part of civil aviation in 
the 1950s, initially to provide positive guidance during instrument landing operations. A mid-air 
collision between two commercial airliners over the Grand Canyon in 1956 served as an impetus for 
the addition of long-range surveillance radar to the air traffic control system, soon allowing positive 
separation during flight over most areas in the continental United States. It was widely recognized 
at this time that improved radar coverage had given new dimensions of sophistication and safety for 
commercial flight operations. What was hardly noticed, however, was that a few hardy general 
aviation pilots had noticed the new system and were beginning to move from Sunday afternoon 
pleasure flights to all-weather business trips from one city to another. However, the system con-
tinued to focus on commercial flight and, to the extent that it acknowledged the presence of the 
few general aviation planes operating in IFR weather, treated them mostly as noise on the radar 
scope. No allowances were made for the meager skills of the pilot or his woefully inadequate 
avionics equipment. 
There is no question but that the initial development of the National Airspace System was 
directed toward the commercial air carriers. And no one can fault this. The rapid and safe move-
ment of large numbers of business and pleasure travelers obviously is a most important national 
priority. But somehow, although not given much in the way of Federal attention, general aviation 
has shown a healthy growth rate for well over twenty years. Avionics manufacturers, ever alert to 
the emergence of a new market, soon developed greatly improved radio and navigation equipment. 
By 1976, an aviation publication was describing the route by which general aviation avionics had 
assumed the role of innovator formerly held by airline avionics (Klass). General aviation aircraft 
kept pace. They became more complex, had greatly improved flight capabilities, and certainly were 
more expensive. 
The position gained by general aviation as a user of the National Airspace System, at the end 
of the 1970s, is shown in Table 1. At airfields with FAA towers, there are five times as many 
operations by general aviation aircraft as by air carriers. There are one and one-half times as many 
instrument flight operations. In fact, since 1975 general aviation has been the largest single user of 
the instrument flight system. Table 1 also shows the number of active airman certificates as of 
1978. Of interest is the significant number of pilots who now hold instrument ratings. 
Table 1 
General Aviation Operations 
(1978) 
Air Carriers 
Total Operations 10,063,259 
(Fields with Towers) 
Total IF R Operations 10,421,496 
Active Airmen Certificates: 
Instrument Ratings Held: 
Private Pilot 
798,833 
32,470 
Commercial Pilot 145,268 
Airline Transport Pilot 55,881 
Source: FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation (1978). 
General Aviation 
50,798,779 
16,310,259 
Best estimates are that the growth of general aviation will continue unabated in the coming 
decade. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) forecasts for 1985 predict a 25 percent increase in 
the number of active pilots, to just under one million. Of these, some 360,000 are expected to hold 
instrument ratings. By far the majority of these instrument-rated airmen will operate in the general 
aviation fleet. 
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It is clear that general aviation is far and away the fastest growing segment in American aviation. 
It also has become a national resource-an integral part of our national transportation system. In 
1978, some 29 percent of the people who traveled intercity by air did so in general aviation aircraft. 
Recent sales figures for corporate aircraft would indicate that this percentage will be larger by 1985. 
How well will general aviation function as a major component in a national system for the 
transport of passengers and goods? Will the typical general aviation pilot benefit in the same manner 
as an airline pilot from the technological changes now taking place in aviation and in air traffic 
control? Certainly we are entering a decade of major advances in aviation systems. Wiener and Curry 
(1980) describe how modern microprocessor technology and display systems make it entirely 
feasible to automate many (if not all) of the flight-deck functions previously performed manually. 
Whether or not such total automation will take place, or is even desirable, is another issue. Certainly 
automation now can be used where it provides a demonstrable benefit. However, before considering 
problems of the general aviation pilot in a technologically advanced world, it would be well to 
review how well he is doing with present systems. 
General Aviation Safety 
There is hardly any better way to examine the efficiency with whiGh general aviation operates as 
a component in the national aviation system than by an examination of its accident rate. It is not 
unreasonable for a passenger boarding a small aircraft to expect the pilot to be fully qualified, 
thc aircraft to be airworthy, and the flight itself to be pleasant and safe. Unfortunately, these 
expectations are not always fulfilled. 
A comparison of the accident rates for general aviation and for the commercial air carriers is 
shown in Table 2. During 1978, general aviation had 4,609 accidents-a lot-compared to the 
26 accidents suffered by the airlines. This gives general aviation an accident rate which is 34 times 
as high as that for carrier operations. Any reaction to the magnitude of this difference should be 
tempered, however, by a realization that this is based on all general aviation flights. The accidents 
include those instances (hopefully rare) in which a pilot decides his flying skills, or his courage, are 
better after two martinis. The numbers also reflect cases in w~ich a pilot swoops low over his 
girlfriend's house and stalls into the ground while looking over his shoulder to see if she came out to 
wave. Finally, there are the cases where an inexperienced pilot presses on into weather, sometimes 
with icing, for which neither he nor the airplane is fully prepared. 
A more reasonable comparison between commercial and general aviation operations is on the 
basis of safety during instrument flight. Here, one can presume that the horseplay element is gone. 
The demands of instrument flight require a professional approach-the full time and attention of 
the pilot must be on completing the flight safely. Yet even here general aviation does not fare too 
well. 
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Table 2 
General Aviation/Air Carrier Accident Rates 
All Accidents - 1978 
Air Carriers General Aviation 
Number 26 4,609 
Rate (100,000 Aircraft H rs.) 0.37 12.59 
Difference: GA is 34 Times Higher 
Instrument Approaches - 1974/1975 
Number of Approaches 1,553,698 1,512,817 
Accidents 4 66 
Rate/1 0,000 Approaches 0.026 0.436 
Difference: GA is 17 Times Higher 
Sources: NTSB Aircraft Accident Data Reports, CY 1974, 75. 
FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation, 1975. 
Table 2 also shows accidents experienced by the two segments of aviation while making 
instrument approaches during a recent two-year period. While the number of approaches flown was 
almost identical for the two groups, the accidents were not. General aviation had 66 accidents 
during IFR approaches, while the airlines had only four. This gives general aviation an accident 
rate which is 17 times as high as that of the carriers. 
Examining the problem from a different perspective, Forsyth and Shaughnessy (1978) reviewed 
the general aviation accident files of the National Transportation Safety Board for a 12-year period 
(1964 through 1975). It was found that over this time, 72 percent of the IFR landing phase 
accidents involved single-pilot operations. Of these, 87 percent were attributed wholely or in 
part to pilot error. The study also found, as seen in Figure 1, that single-pilot pilot error accidents 
increased at a rate of 3.5 accidents per year, while dual-pilot pilot error accidents increased at only 
one· third this rate. 
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Figure l. General aviation landing phase accidents (adapted 
from Forsyth and Shaughnessy, 1978). 
The General Aviation Flight Deck 
The comparisons just presented lead to two conclusions. First, the accident rate for general 
aviation operations, including instrument flight, is high-certainly higher than one would desire. 
Second, IFR flight with a copilot seems to be safer than when only a single pilot is present. 
The accidents experienced in general aviation, especially when flight is conducted under 
instrument rules, can logically be attributed to a number of factors, all subsumed under the broad 
but somewhat misleading rubric "pilot error." First, there is the issue of recency. The Federal 
Aviation Administration states that "No pilot may act as pilot in command under IFR ... unless he 
has, within the past six months, ... logged at least six hours of instrument time under actual or 
simulated IFR conditions, including at least six instrument approaches, or passed an instrument 
competency check." In the extreme instance, this means that a pilot may not have flown IFR for 
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five months and 29 days, yet he is legal in filing for an airport showing a 60.96-meter (200-foot) 
ceiling and 0.8 kilometers (one-half mile) visibility. Whether he will be able to complete an 
approach on arrival at the airport should be a matter of concern. If his proficiency six months 
earlier was excellent, the approach may be fine. If his earlier proficiency was marginal, the approach 
could be quite a hazardous matter. 
The second issue affecting IFR performance is that of training and initial proficiency. While the 
FAA does spell out training requirements and objectives for instrument flight, there is no way in 
which one can equate the scope, quality, and intensity of this training in general aviation with that 
given airline pilots. The task, however, remains the same. During instrument flight conditions, the 
Air Traffic Control system must, by necessity, treat a general aviation pilot with 300 hours no 
differently than an airline crew with a combined total of 30,000 flight hours. 
The final problem, and the one of most consequence for the present effort, is that of cockpit 
workload. Single-pilot instrument flight, particularly without an autopilot, is about as difficult as 
any kind of flying that exists. The pilot must fly the airplane; handle all communications, including 
numerous frequency changes; navigate with precision, using the many necessary charts; comply with 
all ATC procedures; and periodically monitor the performance of fuel and electrical systems. In an 
aircraft which might cruise at 170 and approach at 120 knots, much can happen while the pilot is 
dealing with one of his many tasks. 
The second of the comparisons made in the previous section shows that most of the IFR landing 
phase accidents experienced by general aviation involve single-pilot operations. This comparison of 
single- versus dual-pilot IFR operations suggests a number of things. Although general aviation 
flights are not organized with a clear delineation of crew duties as is found in air carrier operations, 
it is obvious that a copilot does contribute something. He may lighten the workload of the pilot 
by handling all radio communications. He also might assist by calling out airspeed and on-course 
information, as well as by reminding the pilot as he approches Decision Height. He also can leave 
the pilot free to deal only with the cockpit instruments by looking outside for runway lights during 
the final stages of the approach. 
A summary statement of a copilot's duties might well be that he assists in data management in 
the cockpit. He helps to acquire information (ATC communications), to verify critical data items, 
and to assist in the storage of data until needed. All this is of considerable value, as the reduction 
in the accident rate when two pilots are aboard testifies. This also suggests that proper data 
management in the cockpit might well be a most important factor influencing the safety of an IFR 
flight. 
When a copilot is not present, all data management tasks fall on the pilot. During periods of 
high workload, his capability to perform these many tasks, while he is busy flying the airplane, 
may become degraded to a point of real concern. 
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Data Management and Information-Processing 
Qualities of the Human Operator 
Much research in the field of human factors engineering has been conducted on the capabilities 
of a human as an information-processing component in a man/machine system. In the broadest 
sense, this research covers topics such as visual and auditory sensory capabilities, learning, short 
and long-term memory, decision making, fatigue, and motor responses. For present purposes, the 
focus will be on the ability of a human operator to receive a number of items of information and to 
use these items appropriately within a short period of time. Of particular interest is the effect of 
stress and high workload on pilot performance as measured by speed and accuracy of response. 
The following are the key features of the information-processing literature relevant to the 
conditions of single-pilot IFR flight: 
1. Channel Capacity. Since the late 1940s, there has been considerable interest in studying the 
properties of man as an element within a man/machine control system. To the extent that his 
capabilities can be defined in engineering terms, the system can be designed to incorporate these 
capabilities in a manner tending to optimize total system function. While the goal of a strict 
engineering specification of man's capabilities has not been achieved, much has been learned 
concerning how man operates in a system. 
A useful concept which engineering psychology has borrowed from the communications 
engineer is the notion of a channel used to describe the means by which data are conveyed to the 
central mechanism (Murrell, 1971). Of the sensory organs used as channel transducers for external 
stimuli, the visual and auditory channels are most important. However, the term "channel" is not 
necessarily synonymous with "sensory modality." Visual information alone, for example, can be 
presented through a number of channels. 
In a review of human information processing, Senders (1970) notes these broad conclusions 
concerning man's channel capacities: 
a. The operator is a single-channel system. 
b. The channel has a fixed capacity. 
c. The capacity has a single metric by which any task can be measured. 
Murrell (1971) cites evidence tending to show that, at the highest decision-making level, man acts as 
a single-channel mechanism and that the rate at which decisions can be made is strictly limited. 
Once a piece of data enters the channel, there is a psychological refractory period which inhibits the 
receipt of further data. This refractory period is in the order of 0.5 seconds, meaning that about 
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two pieces of data can be passed through a single channel per second. Murrell concludes that if two 
pieces of data arrive almost simultaneously, one will be passed through the channel but the other 
may be delayed or lost altogether. If the data arrive absolutely simultaneously, however, it is 
possible that they can be coded and passed through the channel as one piece. 
The concept of a single-channel limitation for man, while undoubtedly possessing real validity, 
is by no means absolute. Wierwille et al. (1979) note that a great deal of laboratory research exists 
on empirical tests of various ramifications of the single-channel concept. For example, data are 
available on the possibility of multi-channel processing; procedures for switching attention among 
channels; various points of conflict or bottlenecks in the human information-processing channel; 
and variations in upper channel limits due to factors of stress, emotional state, fatigue, and 
effort. In short, single-channel operation is the rule, but this rule shows all the variability which 
characterizes any form of human behavior. Even so, Murrell concludes that "Designers should 
accept the general principle that under no circumstances should equipment be designed or a 
machine cycle be evolved which requires the operator to make two simultaneous decisions, whether 
through one or more sense modality." 
2. Information Storage. By information storage we refer to the short-term memory process. 
Human memory has been studied extensively in the laboratory, but it remains a long step to apply 
the detailed laboratory findings to an operational situation such as instrument flight. For the 
moment, it will suffice to note that in a review of the literature, Craik (1979) comments that 
short-term memory apparently is not "one thing" but is an aggregate of mechanisms and skilled 
processes. 
A particularly relevant study was accomplished recently by Loftus et al. (1979). Even though 
done in the laboratory, the study used an aviation context, which makes it easier to apply its 
findings to the operational scene. Communication between ground controllers and pilots was 
simulated in a short-term memory task in order to explore sources of error. Subjects were asked to 
repeat messages containing place/frequency and transponder code information following a retention 
interval lasting for up to 15 seconds. A typical message was "Contact Seattle center on 128.9. 
Squawk 7126." In a low information-load condition, place/frequency or transponder information 
was given alone. The high-load condition used place/frequency combined with transponder data. 
Figure 2 is a forgetting curve which shows that under both low load and high load there is a 
demonstrable loss of information by 15 seconds. Most important, however, is that under the high-
load condition information (place/frequency plus transponder code) can be recalled correctly in 
only 50 percent of the trials after 15 seconds. The authors conclude that the two major determi-
nants of error are (1) amount of information that the pilot has to process in a given time and 
(2) retention interval between the time information is transmitted from the controller and the time 
it is acted on (recalled) by the pilot. 
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3. Recall Interference. It is well established that the short-term memory system can retain only 
a limited amount of material at anyone time. For instance, in only about 50 percent of trials can 
subjects correctly repeat back a number of random digits when the number reaches seven to eight. 
Welford (1968) notes that this number is reduced if the subject shifts his attention to other material 
during the period between presentation and recall. Any number of studies have shown that the 
introduction of other information during the time of retention will reduce the accuracy of recall. 
The nature of the interpolated information also is important. The more similar the interpolated 
information is to that which one is trying to recall, the less accurate will be the recall. Thus, if one is 
trying to remember a series of digits, the introduction of additional digits during the retention 
period will cause more errors than if letters were to be introduced. In aviation terms, an ATC 
command for a heading change, followed by an altitude change, and completed with a frequency 
change, represents a situation which will tax the accuracy of short-term memory to its limit. 
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4. Workload. The workload placed on a pilot during an instrument landing approach can 
be high and it can affect performance. These are subjective aphorisms-their experimental proof 
is not easily come by. The principal problem is one of specifying just what workload is. Wierwille 
(1979) states that "There is no single, agreed-upon definition of mental workload, and there is 
no single, universal metric of it. Mental workload is a theoretical construct, and as such, might 
best be defined operationally. Clearly, it is related to factors such as operator stress and effort, 
but these concepts also require operational definitions." In a separate report, Williges and Wierwille 
(1979) reviewed 14 general approaches to the problem of developing behavioral measures of aircrew 
workload. They conclude that no single technique can be recommended as the definitive behavioral 
measure of operator workload. They note, however, that the strongest research support exists 
for using subjective opinions and task analytic methods involving task component/time summation. 
In other words, as the number of independent task activities increases and as the pilot reports 
heavier workload during landing approach, we can legitimately describe that as a high-workload 
condition. 
High workload impairs man's ability to manage and to process information. To determine the 
particular characteristics of high workload which are important, Goldstein and Dorfman (1978) 
investigated the effects of speed and load stress where operators responded to moving stimuli 
presented in each of three visual displays. The task was representative of complex man/machine 
systems in which an operator is required to respond to multiple information sources that produce 
large numbers of signals in a short period of time. The authors note that in tasks which require 
response to multiple sources (load stress), timing and anticipation of response is an important aspect 
of human performance, and one which can be disrupted. In tasks with speed stress, the number 
of signals can be expected eventually to reach channel capacity. Also, speed stress can result in 
situations where the signals are bunched together within a short period of time and result in a 
"crisis" situation with significant disorganization of response. 
Goldstein and Dorfman found that increasing the load stress by requiring the operator to 
monitor two or three displays rather than a single display resulted in a significant decrease in 
performance. On the other hand, increasing speed stress, where the operator was monitoring only 
one display, had no appreciable effect on performance. It was possible to increase the number of 
signals per minute from 24 to 72, with the observers continuing to be able to time their responses 
equally well. However, the most important finding of the study is that an increase in speed stress, 
where the operator is working under a load stress represented by two or especially three displays, 
causes a considerable disruption of performance. Figure 3 shows the delay in response, or latency, 
as signal speed increased for the three load conditions. The authors conclude that performance in 
this type of continuous time-sharing task is most negatively affected by load stress, especially in 
conditions which combine high load stress with speed stress. Comparisons certainly can be made 
between the conditions of this experiment and those which exist during the single-pilot instrument 
landing approach. 
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stress (from Goldstein and Dorfman, 1978). 
Conclusions 
72 
One of the principal roles of a human operating in a man/machine system is to manage data and 
process information. Much has been learned of man's capabilities and limitations to perform in this 
role. The design of a man/machine system, if it is to operate efficiently and accurately, must take 
these capabilities and limitations into account. 
Sing1e~pilot IFR flight represents a man/machine system in which the task is imperfectly 
matched to the operator. During the approach-to-Ianding phase, and indeed at other points, critical 
information is presented simultaneously (and rapidly) through both the visual and auditory 
channels. The simultaneous presentation impacts the operator's tendency to function as a single-
channel device. 
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The fact that multiple items of information are presented in rapid bursts of communication 
from ground. controllers means that certain items must be stored until they can be acted upon. 
This storage requirement, particularly if it reaches 10 to 15 seconds, can introduce a rather 
significant error factor. Experimental results would indicate that where the message contains 
place/frequency/transponder code items, the error rate in setting the transponder display could 
reach 50 percent. Also, the fact that most items of ATC information are in the form of numbers 
can increase the extent of recall interference. 
Finally, humans do not work with extreme precision under heavy workload. Experimental 
results indicate that a combination of high load, as represented by information received from 
several displays, when combined with an increasing speed of presentation can seriously disrupt 
performance. This is very much the situation during an instrument landing approach, when the 
pilot is monitoring as many as six displays while receiving command information from an air traffic 
controller. To make matters worse, the speed of information presentation on one display (the 
Course Deviation Indicator of the VOR/ILS display) increases in sensitivity during landing so that 
there is an increase in the speed at which information concerning position change is presented. 
This adds to operator workload in a manner almost designed to reduce accuracy of performance. 
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PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
This is a human factors study of single-pilot IFR flight. An examination of the typical general 
aviation instrument flight, particularly during the approach-to-Ianding phase, indicates that the 
workload imposed by data management is quite heavy and may be a key factor underlying the high 
accident rate. Wiener (1977), in a review of landing accidents in commercial airline operations, 
says that "the message is clear-it is high time to take a fresh look at the problem of cockpit 
workload, procedures, and fatigue." If this is true for the professional world of commercial aviation, 
it certainly is true for general aviation. 
The premise of this study is that cockpit workload can be reduced and IFR proficiency 
improved with a better match between the requirements of the system and the capabilities of the 
pilot. To accomplish this, the following changes appear warranted: 
1. The pilot should be allowed to control the rate at which he deals with incoming Air Traffic 
Control instructions. During a critical period of flight such as an instrument approach, 
the tasks should be self-paced to the extent possible. This is in keeping with the concept 
of the pilot as a single-channel processor in which he maintains some control over channel 
flow rate. Pacing of activities controlled entirely by the system will add both to workload 
and to psychological stress. 
2. Critical items of flight data should be stored until they have been acted upon by the pilot 
and he clears the data himself. The human memory system is enti~ely too fallible to be 
relied on completely during periods of heavy workload. 
3. An appropriate alerting signal should be given whenever a condition bearing on safety of 
flight is entered. Functioning as a single-channel operator, the pilot may find it difficult to 
remain continuously aware of his entry into this boundary condition. It should not be 
left to the pilot to develop the principal warning scheme on his own. 
4. The signal-to-noise ratio of ATC communications should be maximized. There should be no 
opportunity for communications intended for other aircraft to be received or for such 
communications to be blocked by transmissions from other aircraft. There should be no 
requirement for the pilot to serve as a communications filtering device. 
5. The labor associated with the current communication system (handling of microphone, 
read-back of clearances, etc.) should be reduced. 
It is clear that the above objectives cannot be met simply through refinements to the existing 
ATC/aircraft communications system. Billings (1980) recently reported on a summary of over 
23,500 incidents submitted to the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System. Well over one-half of 
these ASRS reports were found to involve a problem in the handling of information. Billings notes 
that, though much aeronautical information is highly dynamic, the problem is not usually that the 
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information is incorrect. It ahnost always is correct at its point of origin. The problem is more likely 
to be in the transfer from its origin to a point where it must be used in decision-making. 
Information is communicated from ATC to pilots currently through a VHF radio link, a link 
which is relatively free of static and other simple noise. Billings further notes that VHF channels are 
often congested, however, and the universal use of simplex communications poses potential, and 
sometimes very hazardous, problems due to blocking of one transmission by another. Blocking 
was thought to be a factor in the Tenerife accident; it appears to be a frequent problem in ASRS 
reports. To reduce the misunderstanding of verbal communications, most clearances now are read 
back after being received. The ASRS data show, however, that even an incorrect readback can be 
misperceived by an ATC controller and acknowledged as correct. 
Bergeron (1980) recently examined ASRS reports which specifically dealt with general aviation 
single-pilot IFR operations. He cataloged the incidents into five major problem areas, one of which 
was "A TC and pilot communication problems." Bergeron found that the communication problems 
were of the following four types: 
• Misunderstanding of instructions 
• Frequency congestion 
• Excessive frequency changes 
• Excessive/impeding procedural requirements. 
These represent some of the specific problems which must be addressed in attempting to improve' 
the match between pilot and system. 
Project Plan 
The plan of this project is to evaluate an alternative to the current VHF voice link for pilot/ 
ATC communications. Many studies show this to represent a key pilot/system mismatch. As an 
alternative, one would tum to a system which could provide the pilot with the necessary infor-
mation for flight control through a non-voice data link. In other words, the requisite flight 
information should simply appear on a display in front of the pilot, thereby allowing him to deal 
with it in a timely and orderly fashion. 
All of this implies use of a digital data link for communications. Indeed, the FAA has been 
working for some time on just such a system, the Discrete Address Beacon System (DABS). The 
DABS system will be discussed in some detail later in this report. For the moment it is sufficient to 
say that its current configuration does not include the presentation of ATC command information 
(heading changes, altitude changes, etc.) nor has the system been evaluated for its human factors 
implications such as reduction of workload and acceptance by pilots. 
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In this project, a prototype system, termed a Flight Data Console (FDC), was developed to 
allow simulation of a digital communications link. While much project effort went toward.hardware 
development, the thrust of the study was a human factors evaluation of the extent to which such a 
system might reduce cockpit workload, improve flight proficiency, and be accepted by general 
aviation pilots. 
The plan for this project involved four principal phases, as described in the following sections. 
Study Problems of Data Management During 
General Aviation Single-Pilot IFR Flight 
A number of instrument approches to facilities in the Washington, D.C. area were recorded 
for study. These included ILS, localizer back course, VOR, NDB, and ASR approaches. For 
purposes of study, key points in some of these approaches were transcribed onto Flight Data Logs. 
The purpose here was not to conduct a systematic study of cockpit workload during instrument 
approaches. These recordings were made simply to obtain information which might serve as a 
comprehensive base for the development of the Flight Data Console. We wished to be certain that 
the console could present all of the key items of information required by a general aviation pilot 
during the various types of instrument approach. 
Design and Construct a Cockpit 
Flight Data Console (FDC) 
A cockpit display was designed and developed which would allow, through appropriate inflight 
simulation, the presentation of both reference and command data from Air Traffic Control. Use 
of this sytem was designed to remove the pilot completely from the ATC voice loop. The intent 
was to construct a device which would allow a general aviation pilot to fly a complete instrument 
approach, including landing, with no voice communications from ATC whatsoever. 
Conduct an Inflight Study 
A human factors study of the Flight Data Console was conducted inflight using general aviation 
pilots. The purpose was to see that the study included realistic conditions of cockpit workload and 
reasonable inflight stress. Four types of approaches were flown into Washington Metropolitan Area 
airports. The performance of subject pilots, as well as problems encountered by them, was recorded 
by a safety pilot. Extensive interviews were conducted with subject pilots at the completion of the 
flights. 
15 
Prepare Recommendations 
The final phase of the project involved the preparation of recommendations, as presented in this 
report, dealing with three topics: 
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1. Avenues for the improvement of data management in general aviation aircraft during 
instrument flight. These recommendations were not to be restricted simply to ways for 
optimizing the use of a device such as the Flight Data Console. 
2. Use of a digital display such as the Flight Data Console for presenting ATC information. 
These recommendations deal with the information to be presented, techniques for display 
of the data items, the placement of such a display in a general aviation cockpit, and ways in 
which a system such as this should be included with other cockpit instrumentation. 
3. Use of an FDC-type system in a future Air Traffic Control environment. The FAA at this 
time is considering digital data link systems for future ATC operations. For these systems to 
achieve their full potential (which is large), human factors issues concerning their use and 
incorporation as a major part of air traffic control should be solved in advance. 
PROCEDURES 
Record Instrument Approaches 
The first step in the design of a cockpit display for presenting ATC information is to decide 
upon the specific data items to be shown. In order to define the data items and to insure that no 
important ones were missed, tape recordings were made of ATC/pilot voice communications during 
a number of instrument approaches. The approaches were made into facilities in the Washington 
area, and included Dulles International Airport, Baltimore-Washington International Airport, 
Hagerstown Airport, and Manassas Airport (Harry P. Davis Field). Some approaches were made 
specifically for recording purposes while at other times the recordings were incidental to a business 
trip. The purpose was to cover as wide a range of approaches as possible. Recordings were made of 
ILS, VOR, localizer back-course, ASR, and NDB approaches. 
Certain of the approaches were transcribed for detailed study, as shown in Figure 4, while 
others merely were reviewed to check the instructions given to the pilot by A TC. It was found 
that these instructions, for a standard approach, generally involve the following data items: 
• Heading change, including direction of turn 
• Altitude change 
• Frequency change 
• Altimeter setting 
• Clearance (cleared for approach, cleared to land). 
Design and Construct a Flight Data Console 
Description 
A cockpit display system for presenting Air Traffic Control information was designed and 
constructed. The system is capable of simulating a digital data link with ATC, thereby allowing a 
pilot to fly an actual instrument approach with no voice communication between the aircraft and 
the ground controller. The system also is capable of storing information until acted upon by the 
pilot and of providing certain warning signals. 
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FLIGHT DATA LOG 
TypeofApproach: __ ~IL=S __________________________ __ Location: Dulles International 
Mission 
phase 
Vectoring 
Initial Approach 
Approx. 
Time 
:00 
1 :00 
4:00 
Communications 
ATe Pilot 
Aztec 76Yankee is 
radar contact, 
expect vectors, 
I LS runway 1 right. 
76Yankee 
Aztec 76Yankee, turn 
right heading 190 
degrees, maintain 
2,000 feet. 
Heading 190, maintain 
2,000, 76Yankee 
Aztec 76Yankee, turn 
right heading 340 
degrees, six from the 
marker, cleared for an 
I LS approach runway 
1 right, wind 330 
at 12. 
Cockpit 
Activities 
-
Approach chart 
selected; ADF, 
Mkr Bcn on; ILS 
frequency set on 
VOR; fuel pumps 
on. Verify each 
navigation 
frequency identi· 
fication code. 
Figure 4. Sample page showing log used for transcription 
of recorded instrument approach. 
Page: --'-___ _ 
Remarks 
Start of landing 
check list. 
The Flight Data Console is made up of three principal parts: a front seat display and data entry 
panel for use by the pilot, as shown in Figure 5, a rear seat display and data entry panel whereby a 
console operator serves as a transducer for ATC instructions (entering ATC commands and 
immediately transmitting these commands to the front seat display), and a battery power unit 
which makes the system independent of the aircraft. Figure 6 shows the hook-up of the three 
principal components of the system. Although every effort was made to keep these units as small as 
possible, considerations of legibility and ease of operation dictated that they be larger than most 
items of cockpit instrumentation. The display unit was 22.9 x 14 x 57 cm in size, while the entry 
keyboard was 13.3 x 12.7 x 3.2 cm. These dimensions played a key role in determining where the 
Flight Data Console could be installed in the project aircraft. 
DATA ENTRY 
KEYBOARD 
DISPLAY 
PANEL ADJUSTABLE 
POST LIGHT 
Figure 5. Flight Data Console front seat installation. 
MESSAGE 
ALERT 
LIGHT 
DH/MDA 
WARNING 
LIGHT 
CONSOLE 
ADJUSTABLE 
BRACKET 
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FRONT CONSOLE 
REAR CONSOLE 
Figure 6. Principal components of Flight Data Console. 
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The unit which presents ATC information uses liquid crystal displays, each of which can present 
up to eight digits. These were chosen because of ease of legibility during daylight conditions. For 
night flights, a small floodlight, using a 12-volt bulb, illuminates the display panel. The pilot's entry 
keyboard uses a standard telephone-type touch system, with approximately one-quarter inch 
movement required for switching. 
Operation 
The Flight Data Console has two modes of operation. In Mode 1, the system presents and 
stores flight data items as entered by the pilot. The FDC in this mode serves as a memory aid 
and, in essence, takes the place of a paper-and-pencil kneepad. In Mode 1, most information items 
(reference data) appear in the right column of the display (Figure 7), although the pilot may enter 
information in the left column if he desires. For the most part, the information to be entered as 
reference data will be that obtained from the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) when 
the airplane is some distance from the airport. 
When operating in Mode 2, the Flight Data Console receives command information from 
Air Traffic Control and presents it principally in the left column of the display (Figure 7). This 
includes instructions for changes in heading (including direction of turn), changes in altitude, 
new frequencies, updated altimeter settings, and, as shown in the bottom two display windows, 
"cleared for approach" and "cleared to land" instructions. When the pilot receives this information 
from A TC, he depresses the acknowledge key, completes the instruction, and presses another key 
to indicate completion. 
In actual operation, an A TC instruction is received by the console operator in the rear seat. He 
enters the information in his entry keyboard and views it on his display, both of which are 
essentially identical to the front seat system, the only difference being that the front seat 
"acknowledge" key is now a "send" key. After the data are entered, the console operator depresses 
the send key, thereby transferring all information to the front seat display. At this time the 
command data item (heading change, for example) and the message light, mounted on the front 
panel, both blink to indicate arrival of a new ATC transmission. The character "M" in each of the 
activated command data displays illuminates to indicate which displays have changed. The pilot 
then depresses the acknowledge key to indicate receipt of the message. The M character remains 
on until he depresses the appropriate display key to indicate not only receipt of the message but 
accomplishment of it. At this time, the message light and the M character both are off, but the 
items remain on display until replaced by new entries. 
As an approach continues, new command data are acquired as needed to continue the approach. 
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DATA 
DISPLAY 
BOARD 
ATCCOMMAND 
DATA 
CLEARED 
APPROACH 
LIGHT 
ADJUSTABLE KEY BOARD ____ .....: 
FRONT CONSOLE 
ERROR LIGHT 
LIQUID CRYSTAL DISPLAYS 
REFERENCE DATA DISPLAYS 
CLEARED TO 
LAND LIGHT 
Figure 7. Features of pilot's display and keyboard. 
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As the pilot descends to within 30.5 m (100 ft) of his Decision Height or Minimum Descent 
Altitude, a red light mounted at the top of the FDC holding bracket begins to flash as a warning for 
the pilot to monitor carefully his descent altitude. 
The two display windows located just above the clearance lights were not used in this study, 
although the right window does show a number indicating in which mode the system is operating. 
These spare display windows were provided in order that the system might be expanded for future 
use by the NASA Langley Research Center. 
Conduct an Inflight Study 
Simulator Pretest 
The Flight Data Console was pretested during two hours of simulator flight using the NASA 
Langley General Aviation Simulator. This served the dual purpose of examining the operation of the 
console as well as testing the adequacy of data-collection instruments. The principal problem noted 
during the simulator runs was one of alerting the pilot as new information is presented on the FDC. 
As a result, a blinking red "message" signal was placed on the pilot's instrument panel adjacent to 
the ADF indicator and directly within the pilot's primary scan pattern. Subsequent testing showed 
this to be a successful solution. 
Another problem noted during the simulator pretest was the inability of a subject pilot to 
receive unusual ATC commands such as "Make a 360-degree turn for spacing." Since in any later 
operational use of the FDC concept, it is presumed that there will always be a backup voice 
channel, it was decided to simulate such a channel for the evaluation flights. A one-way intercom 
system was installed which allows the safety pilot, in the right seat, to transmit unusual ATC 
commands to the subject pilot through the intercom set. However, except for atypical commands 
which could not be programmed through the FDC, the subject pilot was unable to hear any ATC 
communications. 
Aircraft Installation 
The Flight Data Console was installed in a twin-engine Aztec aircraft. This aircraft was selected 
since it has adequate interior dimensions to allow installation of the console, is stable in flight, 
and can be mastered rapidly by multi-engine rated pilots with no prior flight time in the aircraft. 
The Aztec also is a popular twin and is considered typical of the general aviation fleet. 
Figure 5 shows the installation of the Flight Data Console in the front-seat area of the Aztec 
aircraft. The front console ideally would be located at some point on the instrument panel or on the 
pilot's control yoke so it might be incorporated easily within the instrument scan pattern. The final 
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positioning behind the throttle quadrant was accepted as a compromise to avoid costly and time 
consuming aircraft redesign approval and retrofit of such equipment. 
Both the front and rear seat consoles are mounted in adjustable brackets, with the power unit 
contained within the copilot's seat-back pocket, as seen in Figure 8. The mounting brackets lock 
into the aircraft front and rear seat runners, using special attachments. Figure 8 also shows the 
location of controls for the message alert light, the DH/MDA warning light, and the intercom 
system. 
The location of the rear seat console between the two seats, as seen in Figure 9, permits 
operation from either side. Both fore and aft console mounting brackets provide adjustable post 
lights for night operation. Power for these lights is obtained through a temporary installation using 
the aircraft electrical system. The message alert light and the DH/MDA warning light also are 
operated from this source. 
The primary message alert signal is located on the aircraft instrument panel (Figure 5). This 
light, which flashes concurrently with the sending operation, is activated by the console operator 
through a control box located beneath the rear console (Figure 8). There also is a warning light on 
the front of the front seat console mounting bracket which is flashed, by the console operator in 
the rear seat, as the aircraft reaches an altitude of 30.5 m (100 ft) above the DH/MDA altitude. 
Subject Pilots 
Nine pilots were used in the project, one for pretest and eight for evaluation flights. All subjects 
possessed either a private or commercial license and all had multi-engine and instrument ratings. 
With one exception, all pilots were obtained through informal contacts at the Manassas, Virginia, 
airport. 
Appendix A shows the flight experience of the subject pilots. One pilot, a test pilot from the 
NASA Langley Research Center, was atypical in terms of flight experience, having 7,000 hours of 
total flight time. The remainder ranged from 350 to 1,700 flight hours. Again with one exception, 
instrument flight time ranged from 20 to 225 total hours. As a measure of currency, instrument 
time in the last six months was obtained. This averaged to 13.6 hours for the group. Of the eight 
subject pilots, four were found to have had previous flight time in an Aztec/Apache type aircraft. 
Evaluation Flights 
The inflight evaluation phase consisted of four flights. The first flight was preceded by an 
indoctrination session, lasting about one hour, during which the operation of the Flight Data 
Console was demonstrated and an introduction given to the Aztec aircraft. The four flights were: 
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MOUNTING 
BRACKETS 
Figure 8. Location of ancillary controls for the rear-seat FDC operator. 
(Photograph taken from rear of aircraft cabin facing forward.) 
Figure 9. Installation of rear-seat Flight Data Console. 
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SEAT 
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Flight A (two pilots)-In this flight, the subjeet pilot flew with an instrument-rated copilot and 
was frec to use the copilot in any way he desired. In order not to bias the subject pilot, specific 
ways for use of a copilot (communications, chart handling, etc.) were not mentioned. The only 
restriction was that the copilot could not actually fly the aircraft. Flight with a fully qualified 
instrument-rated copilot was considered optimum in terms of reducing workload and making the 
flight as proficient and safe as possible. Therefore, this flight was intended to provide a baseline 
against which other flights might be compared. 
Flight B (one pilot-FDC/memory)-Here the pilot was alone, in the sense that the safety pilot 
did not participate. The subject pilot used the Flight Data Console as a data storage system 
(memory aid) to assist during each instrument approach. 
Flight C (one pilot-no FDC)-This is the customary single-pilot instrument flight. No special aids 
were available to the pilot and again the safety pilot did not participate. This is the type of flight 
which apparently needs improvement if the accident rate is to be reduced. 
Flight D (one pilot-FDC/ATC)-In this flight, all approaches were flown using Air Traffic 
Control information provided through the Flight Data Console. 
Flights A and B both were flown under daylight conditions in the late afternoon. The order of 
flight was counterbalanced, with half of the pilots flying an AlB program and half flying a BI A 
program. A comparison of these two flights was intended to indicate how a formalized data storage 
system, such as the FDC, might serve to provide some of the same kind of help obtained from a 
copilot. 
Flights C and D were flown at night, on some occasions under actual instrument conditions. In 
any event, they were all flown as instrument flights, although a hood was not used. A comparison 
of these two flights, the order of which again was counterbalanced, should indicate the extent to 
which an ATC-interactive Flight Data Console could improve the single-pilot IFR flight situation. 
Standard Flight Plan 
Each of the four flights lasted for approximately one and one-half hours and included four 
instrument approaches. Each flight was flown on an IFR flight plan out of Manassas airport 
(Harry P. Davis Field). To the extent that traffic conditions allowed, a standard flight plan was 
followed, as shown in Figure 10. Departure course was to the Casanova VOR. However, ATC 
quickly vectored the aircraft toward Dulles airport for an ILS approach. This was followed by an 
NDB approach back to Manassas, and then a VOR approach to the Warrenton-Fauquier airport, 
operating from the Casanova VOR. Next, an ASR approach was made back to Dulles, followed by a 
VFR return to the Manassas airport. All approaches were made to minimum altitude except in the 
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rare instance when ATC required a landing. The reason for the fixed flight plan, as opposed to a 
randomized order for making the approaches, was that this sequence was found to be most 
economical in terms of time and fuel and was most logical in terms of Dulles approach procedures. 
(J:~(RMEL VOR \.'b DULLES 
4ASR 
CASANOVA VOR @I ~O WARRENTON - FAUQUIER 
Figure 10. Standard flight plan for evaluation flights. 
Data Collection Procedures 
Data recording forms were prepared for completion during and after each evaluation flight. The 
three classes of information collected were: 
Objective Measures. Measures of flight proficiency were recorded by the safety pilot during each 
approach. These measures included: 
• Missed instructions 
• Instructions followed improperly 
• Response time, in seconds, from completion of controller message to start of flight 
maneuver 
• Flight path deviations including changes in heading and altitude 
• Descent below Minimum Descent Altitude. 
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Safety Pilot Ratings. The safety pilot rated the adequacy of flight proficiency at the end of each 
approach, using a ten-point rating scale which extended from "unsatisfactory" to "excellent." He 
also added comments concerning any unusual aspects of the approach. 
Subject Pilot Ratings and Comments. At the conclusion of a flight, the subject pilot was asked 
to evaluate his performance for each of the four approaches made during that flight (ILS, VOR, 
NDB, and ASR) using the same ten-point scale as employed by the safety pilot. He was asked to 
make two such evaluations, the first dealing with the adequacy of the approach and the second 
covering the workload experienced during the approach. This was followed, again, by general 
comments on unusual problems. 
Specific questions were asked which pertained only to specific flights. For Flight A, the 
question concerned the extent to which the copilot was of help. For Flight B, the question dealt 
with the help provided by the Flight Data Console while serving as a memory aid, its good and 
bad points, and the extent to which it served as a copilot. For Flight D, the question concerned 
the help provided by the Flight Data Console when it served as a replacement for ATC voice 
communications, and its good and bad points in that mode of operation. 
Following the completion of all flights, the subject pilot was asked to rank, using a scale ranging 
from one to four, the four flights according to how safe a flight was felt to be, the workload 
imposed by the conditions of the flight, and the personal preference (or acceptance) of the pilot for 
each flight. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
There are two features of this project which influence how the results are presented and, more 
important, how they should be interpreted. The first is that this is a proof of concept study. It is 
not a field evaluation of a new item of cockpit instrumentation. The second is that it is a field 
study. As such, it is subject to all the advantages and disadvantages of such investigations. 
A proof of concept study validates an idea or an approach to a solution. The setting, proce-
dures, and equipment needed to present the concept are not legitimately part of the evaluation. 
The only reasonable question is "Does the concept appear to work?" In this study, the evaluation is 
concerned primarily with the extent to which the introduction of a digital data link system for ATC 
communications might reduce single-pilot workload and thereby improve general aviation safety. 
Additional considerations were to determine pilot acceptance for such a change and to identify 
human factors issues which would influence the effectiveness of a digital data link system, as 
represented in this instance by the Flight Data Console. The adequacy of the engineering design of 
the FDC as a cockpit instrument is of little concern. 
The fact that this project was conducted in the field has considerable bearing on interpretation 
of results. The principal advantages of a field study, and these are major ones, are twofold. First, 
realistic stresses and contingencies automatically are built into the experimental plan. Second, 
the results can immediately be applied to operations in the real world. There is no question 
concerning the accuracy of extrapolation, as often is found with results from simulation work. 
The opposite side of the coin presents certain disadvantages for field studies. There is the 
obvious lack of total control over the conduct of the experiment. If Air Traffic Control, faced with 
a deluge of DC-lOs and 74 7s, asks you to land just as you are preparing to measure missed approach 
proficiency, you land. That's all. There also is a noticeable loss of experimental precision during 
field work. The ability to measure flight path deviations during moderate turbulence inflight, 
for example, is a far cry from what can be done in a simulator. Therefore, one finds that certain 
measures simply cannot be made inflight and that the accuracy of measurement for what can be 
done often is poor. 
Use of Copilot 
The roles of crewmembers and their working interrelationships are carefully delineated for 
airline operations. In general aviation, since so much flying is done with a single pilot, little if any 
attention has been given to crewmember roles and, in particular, to the way in which a copilot 
might be used. Yet, a copilot can make a real contribution to flight safety by assuming some of the 
cockpit tasks and lessening the workload on the pilot. This is especially true during instrument 
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flight. But the potential contribution of the copilot is wasted if the pilot chooses, by virtue of 
preference or flying style, not to use his services in any way. 
In this project, the eight subject pilots were asked, just prior to Flight A, how they normally 
used a copilot and whether such use made IFR flight easier, reduced the workload, or made it 
safer. Results are presented in Appendix B. This shows that a copilot is most frequently used to aid 
with communications and radio work. It is of interest that not all pilots felt that use of a copilot 
makes an IFR flight any safer or reduces the workload. 
Appendix B also presents results of a question concerning the most difficult aspect of single-pilot 
IFR flight. The responses of the pilots encompassed seven items, with radio work/communications 
not being one of the items. For whatever reasons, the services of a copilot do not seem to be applied 
to those tasks which are considered most difficult. 
At the completion of Flight A, pilots were asked "How was the copilot of most help to you?" 
Responses are presented in Table 3. These results closely match those obtained with the preflight 
questionnaire. Again, the principal use of a copilot is to assist with radio communications. Although 
not shown in these responses, the safety pilot reported that only one of the eight subject pilots 
asked for altitude call-outs during Flight A, even though four instrument approaches to altitude 
minimums were made during this flight. 
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Table 3 
Crew Activities 
-Use of Copilot-
Assist With 
Radio Communications 
Radio Navigation 
Navigation Charts 
IF R Procedures 
Missed Appro?ch Procedures 
Aircraft Familiarization 
Number 
6 
1 
1 
1 
3 
The above results show great disparity in the manner in which different pilots use the services of 
a qualified copilot during IFR flight. The most frequent use, presumably to reduce the workload of 
the pilot, is with radio communications. In one use with obvious importance for flight safety, that 
of providing altitude call-outs during instrument approaches, the services of the copilot are rarely 
employed. This infrequent use of copilot services undoubtedly is due to training, i.e., general 
aviation pilots typically are not trained in dual pilot operations. 
Objective Measures of Performance 
The use of objective measures of performance, taken inflight, was considered most desirable. 
Such information could augment the questionnaire responses of subject pilots and the safety pilot 
and aid in the evaluation of the different flight regimes. The objective measures sought included 
missed instructions, instructions followed improperly, response time following receipt of an ATC 
command, flight path deviations in heading and altitude, and descent below minimum altitude. 
For a number of reasons, the attempt to obtain objective measures was discontinued during the 
project flights, with one exception. It was soon discovered that obtaining a systematic and accurate 
measurement record for each of the variables considered would require extensive pretesting of 
procedures, additional training for project personnel, additional flight time, and better cockpit 
recording equipment. All of this was beyond the resources of the project. In addition, there was no 
real feeling that these measures would add appreciably to an evaluation based on the systematic 
reports provided by subject pilots and the safety pilot. 
An example of the problems encountered is found 10 the measure of "Time to respond" 
following a command from a ground controller. When the command was given through the voice 
channel, almost invariably the pilot began the maneuver before the command was completed. Thus 
for the command "Turn left to a heading of 210 degrees. Descend to and maintain 1,700 feet" the 
aircraft usually was well into a left roll before the instruction was completed. 
When the Flight Data Console was used to provide ATC commands, the procedures required 
of the pilot were much different. In this case, he needed to observe the message light, check the 
display panel for the instruction, depress the acknowledge button, and start the maneuver. How-
ever, frequently pilots began this maneuver prior to pushing the acknowledge button. Again, this 
made precise measurement of response time essentially impossible. 
Problems such as these introduced so much error into the objective measurement scheme 
that the process was soon abandoned. This, of course,does not mean that objective measures of 
performance cannot be obtained inflight. It merely points to the complexity and difficulty of the 
task and makes it quite clear that when such measures are needed, obtaining them must be of 
central concern. This was not the case here. 
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One objective measure was pursued through all flights. This was the recording of instances of 
descent below Minimum Descent Altitude during the various approaches. Table 4 presents the 
results of these recordings. During all flights, there were five instances in which a pilot continued his 
descent below the MDA. Surprisingly, two of these instances occurred when the subject pilot was 
free to use the safety pilot as a copilot. Had the copilot been requested to call out descent altitudes, 
these two instances could have been avoided. This clearly points out that general aviation pilots do 
not have the training or insight to use a copilot to full advantage. 
Table 4 
Descent Below Minimum Altitude 
Flight 0-50 ft 51-100 ft 101-150 ft 
A (Copilot) V V 
B (FDC/Memory) V V 
C (Single Pilot) 
D (FDC/ATC) 
,,= One Event 
There were three instances of descent below MDA when the Flight Data Console was being used 
as a memory aid. These violations occurred even though the Minimum Descent Altitude was clearly 
shown on the display. Obviously, if the FDC is to be used in this mode, more attention must be 
given to ineluding it in the instrument scan during the approach. 
Since only eight pilots served as subjects and since there were only five instances of unauthorized 
descent, one must exercise caution not to make too much of these results. However, two con-' 
elusions, one firm and one tentative, might be drawn. First, general aviation pilots should know 
how to use a copilot when one is aboard. Commercial air carriers have required altitude call-outs 
from the copilot for years. Second, the altitude warning signal provided by the Flight Data Console 
seems to be effective in preventing pilots from descending below minimum altitude during an 
instrument approach. 
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Workload and Performance 
Workload, when it exceeds manageable limits and particularly when it is combined with speed 
stress, can disrupt performance. The definition of workload, as noted in the earlier review, is 
tenuous. The limits of workload manageability depend on the individual, his training, the task, the 
work context, and a host of other variables. However, one may still conclude that workload stress 
will impair performance. In aviation, high workload conditions occurring at a time when precision 
in flight is required will increase the likelihood of an accident. During a single-pilot IFR approach, it 
is most important that workload not be high, particularly not so high that the pilot feels it as 
a stress factor. 
The measurement of workload was considered of such importance that it was approached in 
two ways in this project. In the first procedure, each pilot was asked to rate his workload, on a scale 
from one to ten, for each of the four approaches flown during that flight. Averaging these, a single 
rating of workload conditions was obtained following each of the four flights. Figure 11 shows 
the results. The averaged ratings indicate higher workload for Flights A and B than for Flights C 
and D (see Appendix C for complete ratings). This may reflect the fact that Flights A and B (in 
counterbalanced order) always were flown before Flights C and D (in counterbalanced order). The 
reduction of workload for the latter flights thus could be attributed simply to increased familiarity 
with the airplane and the experimental situation. 
In the second procedure, pilots were asked, at the completion of the full-flight program, to 
rank order the four flights in terms of the workload imposed by each. Figure 12 shows the results 
(see Appendix D for complete rankings). 
The averaged workload rankings shown in Figure 12 present a different picture than is seen in 
Figure 11. Here, Flights A and D are judged to have significantly less workload than Flights Band C. 
Since these rankings were made at one point in time, the temporal effects reflected in Figure 11 
should be reduced. These rankings are believed to be a more valid indicator of actual workload 
conditions. 
A consideration of flight conditions indicates that Flight A (copilot present) and Flight D (FDC 
interactive with ATC) should impose less workload than the other two flights. Certainly, whatever 
help a copilot provides will serve to decrease the workload, especially since the pilot was free to call 
on the copilot at any time he felt pressed. In Flight D, the requirement to manipulate microphones 
and read back clearances, as found with voice communications systems, was removed. This certainly 
should decrease the workload. The post-flight rankings indicate that it does. 
The performance level attained during each flight was rated, on a zero (unsatisfactory) to ten 
(excellent) scale, following the flight by both the subject pilot and the safety pilot. Each rating 
represents an average of the performance on the four types of instrument approach made during 
the flight. Then the ratings were combined for the eight subject pilots. Results are shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 11. Average workload ratings obtained after each flight (0 = light, 10 = very heavy). 
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Figure 12. Average workload rankings obtained following completion of all flights ( 1 = heavy, 4 = very 
light). Note that ranking scale is inverted to allow direct comparison with Figure 11. 
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Figure 13. Judgments of flight performance by the safety pilot 
and by subject pilots following each flight. 
Performance on Flights C and D was judged, both by subject pilots and by the safety pilot, 
to be better than that on Flights A and B. Again, however, an order effect might be operating. 
Flights C and D always occurred after Flights A and B. The simple fact that pilots were more 
familiar with the airplane in later flights could account for the apparent improvement in perfor-
mance. 
The fact of increasing experience does not affect comparisons between Flights A and B and 
between Flights C and D, since in these instances order of flight was counterbalanced. Half of the 
subject pilots flew Flight D before Flight C, for example. The counterbalancing therefore allows 
realistic comparisons to be made in the two cases of most interest. The results show that use of the 
Flight Data Console as a memory aid (Flight B) does not change performance over that found in 
Flight A, in which the subject pilot had a qualified copilot at his disposal. Comments by the safety 
pilot indicate that this lack of difference may have nothing really to do with any underlying merit 
of the Flight Data Console. In Flight A, most subject pilots made little if any use of the copilot. In 
Flight B, they were insufficiently skilled in the operation of the FDC to get any real benefit from its 
presence. Therefore, Flights A and B became in effect training flights for the final half of the 
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experimental program. This is one interpretation. The fact that workload was judged higher in the 
FDC/Memory mode than with a copilot (Figure 12) may lead to another interpretation. The 
equality in performance could simply reflect the additional reserve capacity called on by pilots 
flying the FDC in order to maintain an acceptable level of performance. 
The performance comparison of most interest is between Flight C (single.pilot IFR) and 
Flight D (FDC providing ATC commands). Again, there is no real difference in judged performance 
levels. Proficiency of flight is considered to be about the same when flying alone and using the 
customary voice radio procedures, or when flying with the FDC providing ATC information 
through a digital link. However, referring to Figure 12, we see that the workload is considered to be 
much higher when pilots are flying alone. This situation therefore may be one which reflects the 
observation by Roscoe (1979) that changes in handling and workload are not always reflected in 
changes in performance. Roscoe cites the comment by Spiker et al. "An evaluation procedure which 
relies exclusively on performance measures is inadequate. That is, a pilot with one configuration 
may work twice as hard as he does with another, yet achieve equal performance with both." What 
is seen in the comparison of Flights C and D may reflect this ability of pilots to maintain a 
performance standard while "compensating" for much different workload conditions. The 
compensation may be at a price, however, which increases the accident potential. Although 
performance standards were maintained under the conditions of these flights, the higher workload 
found under the conditions of single·pilot IFR (Flight C) could take its toll were additional tasks or 
emergency conditions to be introduced suddenly. Certainly the considerable increase in workload 
seen in single-pilot IFR, when compared with workload during use of a copilot, offers a very 
reasonable explanation for the fact that many more landing phase accidents occur with a single 
pilot operating than when two are present. 
Safety and Acceptance 
There are two questions, involving purely psychological dimensions, which a pilot may ask in 
evaluating a new flight system. These are: "Does use of the system seem to make flight any safer?" 
and "Would I like to use the system in my airplane?" 
The dimensions of safety and acceptance obviously are correlated. No rational aviator is going 
to prefer a system if he feels it reduces safety of flight. Yet each of the two judgments contributes 
something different to a comprehensive evaluation of a flight system. Therefore pilots were asked to 
rank the four evaluation flights separately along each of these dimensions. The results of these 
rankings are presented in Appendices E and F. 
The safety rankings show exactly what one would expect. There is a significant difference in the 
rankings for the four flight conditions, with Flight A, use of a copilot, being considered the most 
safe. There is an obvious measure of security in knowing that the person sitting next to you is a 
fully qualified instrument-rated pilot. 
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The acceptance rankings did not present nearly as clear a picture as was found for safety. 
Statistically, there was no difference among the flights in terms of pilot acceptance. However, the 
data do indicate a tendency for Flight B (use of the Flight Data Console as a memory aid) to be less 
preferred than any of the remaining three flights. Of particular interest are the rankings shown in 
Appendix F for Flight D (FDC used for ATC communications). Here we see that two pilots selected 
this system as most preferred, while another two chose it as least preferred. The next section 
explores some of the reasons underlying this ambivalence. 
Acceptance Comments 
Many factors influence the acceptance of new systems. Hopefully, the utility of the system is a 
primary factor, but many others, such as appearance, location, size, uniqueness, etc., may be 
important in establishing a final level of acceptance. Since acceptance is of such consequence in 
determining how equipment will be used and, in large measure, the extent to which design 
objectives can be achieved, every effort was made to allow pilots to express opinions concerning 
good and bad features of the Flight Data Console. These opinions were reviewed and placed into 
a limited number of categories. The following sections present typical comments, shortened 
somewhat for this report, and show the classification scheme used. 
Positive Comments 
Communications Effectiveness 
"There is no confusion as to who the instruction from the ground is for." 
"Y ou can hardly miss a call. " 
"N 0 misunderstanding or forgetting numbers. " 
Workload Reduction 
"No fumbling with pencil, kneeboard, mike, or volume control." 
"I found the FDC/ATC to be very easy to use and (it provided) much relief of workload." 
Cockpit Conditions 
"I like the quiet of the radio-free environment." 
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Negative Comments 
Human Engineering 
"Position of FDC is horrible. Could use it better if more forward." 
"Position of FDC detracts from instrument scan." 
"Difficult to read in daylight." 
"Every time I used it, I had to screw my body into a weird contortion." 
Information Restriction 
"I would feel most comfortable with the FDC used in conjunction with a radio." 
"Voice security blanket is significant." 
"N ot able to question ATC. " 
"FDC tends to force greater reliance on ATC than I'm ready to give." 
In summary, the comments indicate that a digital data link system, as simulated by the Flight 
Data Console, may represent an improved ATC channel with good prospects for reducing cockpit 
workload. However, for the system to achieve its potential, it must be located for ease of view and 
operation and it should incorporate a voice channel as backup. 
Air Traffic Control Implications 
Development programs are underway at this time which will cause the air traffic control 
environment five to ten years from now to be much different. The impact for change is coming 
from a combination of traffic saturation, altered patterns of air travel, and significant advances in 
electronics and control systems engineering. Microprocessors, electronic displays, and voice-
activated data entry systems will make the communications link between aircraft and Air Traffic 
Control a much different matter in future years. 
The NASA Ames Research Center has been supporting a Demonstration Advanced Avionics 
System (DAAS), a development program accomplished by Honeywell Avionics Division and King 
Radio Corporation. The purpose is to develop the technology for an integrated avionics system 
for use in general aviation in the coming decade. The system uses data bussing, distributed 
microprocessors, and shared electronic displays. Such a system is very advanced, very expensive, and 
shows what the future holds in store. One part of this system includes a display whereby ATC 
communications can be presented to a general aviation pilot in much the same manner as was done 
with the Flight Data Console in this project. 
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The Federal Aviation Administration is supporting the development of the Discrete Address 
Beacon System (DABS). This system, scheduled to become operational in the mid-1980s, will 
provide an automatic data link connecting Air Traffic Control and other data sources to aircraft in a 
two-way digital transmission loop. The advantages of the DABS concept are many. It will provide 
more accurate tracking of aircraft than is obtained now with transponder and raw radar returns. It 
will be able to communicate with one aircraft to the exclusion of all others. It also will offer a pilot 
a broader range of routine information than he now receives, including enroute weather and 
enhanced terminal information. Finally, the FAA believes use of DABS will lead to improved 
cockpit data flow and reduced workload both for controllers and for pilots. 
In its initial installation, DABS will not provide Air Traffic Control command instructions, as 
were presented with the Flight Data Console. However, the capability is there and it is presumed 
that shortly after its introduction, use of the system will be expanded ~o include such com-
munications. Grayson (unpublished data) reviewed the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System 
files in order to catalog the kinds of problems DABS might serve to improve. Table 5 presents his 
assessment of the impact of DABS on present communications problems. The improvement through 
use of DABS should be considerable. 
Table 5 
Impact of DABS Data Link on Communications Problems 
Problem Code No. of Reports Eliminate Mitigate Exacerbate No Impact 
Phonetic Similarity 71 X 
Transposition 85 X 
Other I naccu racies 792 X 
Incomplete 296 X 
Ambiguous 529 X 
Untimely 710 X 
Garbled 171 X 
Absent 1991 X 
Equipment Failure 153 ? ? 
Not Monitoring 553 X 
From Grayson, R.L. Unpublished report by Battele Columbus Laboratories. 
The results of the present project can be applied directly to the DABS program. If DABS is to 
be as successful as the FAA believes and as Grayson implies, serious attention must be given to the 
human factors problems associated with the introduction of such a system into the general aviation 
flight scene. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
General aviation is the largest and fastest growing segment in American aviation, having many 
more aircraft and flying many more hours than the commercial airlines. Since 1975, it has been the 
largest single user of the instrument flight system. Carrying roughly one· third of the people who 
travel intercity by air, general aviation has become an integral part of our national transportation 
system. 
The emerging role for general aviation in air transportation is accompanied, unfortunately, by 
an accident rate considerably higher than that found in commercial operations. During instrument 
approaches, general aviation was found to have, over a two·year period, an accident rate 17 times as 
high as that of the carriers. A closer review of these accidents shows that almost 90 percent are 
attributed wholely or in part to pilot error. Of these pilot error accidents, the preponderance occur 
during single·pilot IFR flight. 
The conditions of single-pilot instrument flight, particularly without an autopilot, show heavy 
workload conditions. Much of this workload is a function of critical requirements for data manage-
ment and information processing of ATC data items. The reduced number of accidents when a 
copilot is aboard is believed to result from the sharing of the data management tasks. 
In this project, a Flight Data Console (FDC) was developed to allow simulation of a digital 
communications link to replace the current voice communications system. The voice system 
requires manipulation of radio equipment, read-back of clearances, and mental storage of critical 
information items, all contributing to high workload. This study was a human factors evaluation 
of a digital communications system, as represented by the Flight Data Console, to determine how 
such a system might reduce cockpit workload, improve flight proficiency, and be accepted by 
general aviation pilots. 
The Flight Data Console was evaluated inflight, using general aviation pilots, in order to 
encompass realistic conditions of cockpit workload and reasonable inflight stress. Instrument 
approaches were flown into Washington Metropolitan Area airports. In one flight condition, the 
Flight Data Console allowed a full instrument approach to be completed with no voice com-
munications between the pilot and ATC. The performance of subject pilots, as well as problems 
encountered by them, was recorded by a safety pilot. Extensive interviews were conducted with 
subject pilots at the completion of the flights. 
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The results of this project support the following conclusions and recommendations. 
Inflight Data Management 
1. There are no formalized rules for the management of in flight data in general aviation except 
as imposed by the nature of the tasks. This results in considerable variability in the manner 
in which information processing is done. Some pilots jot data on knee-pads; others rely 
entirely on memory; still others manipulate panel instruments as an aid. Results of this 
study indicate more elaborate electronic devices, serving only as memory aids, are of little 
value. 
2. General aviation pilots tend either not to use the services of a qualified copilot or to use 
him poorly. The most frequent use, presumably to reduce workload, is with radio com-
munications. In one use with obvious importance for flight safety, that of providing 
altitude callouts during instrument approaches, the services of the copilot are rarely 
employed. 
Use of a Digital Display (Flight Data Console) 
3. Instrument flight, including approach and landing, can be accomplished by general aviation 
pilots receiving all Air Traffic Control communications through a digital data link system 
like the Flight Data Console. 
4. The cockpit workload during an instrument approach with ATC providing information 
through the Flight Data Console was judged by subject pilots to be less than that found 
when flying alone and using the normal voice communications link. This is possibly the 
most significant finding of the study. Use of the FDC, in its ATC interactive mode, 
reduced workload to the point where it matched that found when a qualified copilot was 
present. 
5. Flight performance using the FDC was comparable to that achieved in single-pilot IFR 
flight. However, the considerably greater workload when flying alone, using normal voice 
channels, would imply that the maintenance of flight proficiency is at some cost to the 
pilot's reserve work capacity. 
6. A digital data link communications system is entirely feasible for general aviation flight 
operations. There are, however, a number of human factors issues which must be addressed 
if such a system is to achieve its potential. Great care must be taken in placing the sytem in 
the cockpit. Message content must be matched to pilot needs, instrument scan must be 
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considered, and display complexity should not be great. In addition, a VOIce channel 
allowing instant communication with the controller, if necessary, should be included as a 
backup system. 
Future Air Traffic Control Environment 
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7. The direction of efforts supported by the FAA, NASA, and industry is toward presentation 
of cockpit information through electronic systems. Results of this study indicate that ATC 
command information, including maneuvering instructions, can be provided to general 
aviation pilots through a digital data-link display rather than through a voice link. System 
efficiency (including capacity) should increase through the elimination of a read-back 
requirement and a reduction in errors of interpretation. The present study supports move-
ment toward use of digital communications and electronic displays. 
REFERENCES 
Bergeron, H.P. Analysis of general aviation single-pilot IFR incident data obtained from the NASA 
aviation safety reporting system (NASA Technical Memorandum 80206). Hampton, Va.: 
Langley Research Center, October 1980. 
Billings, C.E. Aviation safety reporting system briefs. Association of Aviation Psychologists News-
letter, June 1980,8(1),3-4. 
Canby, C. A history of flight. New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1963. 
Conover, W.J. Practical nonparametric statistics. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971. 
Craik, F.I.M. Human memory. In M.R. Rosenzweig & L.W. Porter (Eds.), Annual review of 
psychology (Vol. 30). Palo Alto, Ca.: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1979. 
Forsyth, D.L., & Shaughnessy, J.D. Single pilot IFR operating problems determined from accident 
data analysis (NASA Technical Memorandum 78773). Hampton, Va.: Langley Research Center, 
September 1978. 
Goldstein, I.L., & Dorfman, P.W. Speed and load stress as determinants of performance in a time 
sharing task. Human Factors, 1978,20(5),603·609. 
Klass, P.J. Civil needs spur technological advances. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1978, 
105(7), pp. 51; 54·55. 
Loftus, G.R., Dark, V.J., & Williams, D. Short·term memory factors in ground controller/pilot 
communication. Human Factors, 1979,21 (2), 169·181. 
Murrell, K.F.H. Ergonomics-man in his working environment. London: Chapman and Hall, 1971. 
Roscoe, A.H. Handling qualities, workload and heart rate. In B.O. Hartman & R.E. McKenzie 
(Eds.), Survey of methods to assess workload (AGARDograph No. 246). London: Technical 
Editing and Reproduction Ltd., August 1979. 
Senders, J.W. The estimation of operator workload in complex systems. In K.B. DeGreene (Ed.), 
Systems psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1970. 
43 
Welford, A. T. Fundamentals of skill. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1968. 
Wiener, E.L., & Curry, R.E. Flight-deck automation: Promises and problems (NASA Technical 
Memorandum 81206). Moffett Field, Ca.: Ames Research Center, June 1980. 
Wiener, E.L. Controlled flight into terrain accidents: System-induced errors. Human Factors, 1977, 
19(2),171-181. 
Wierwille, W.W. Physiological measures of aircrew mental workload. Human Factors, 1979, 21 (5), 
575-593. 
Wierwille, W.W., Williges, R.C., & Schiflett, S.G. Aircrew workload assessment techniques. In 
B.O. Hartman & R.E. McKenzie (Eds.), Survey of methods to assess workload (AGARDograph 
No. 246). London: Technical Editing and Reproduction Ltd., August 1979. 
Williges, R.C., & Wierwille, W.W. Behavioral measures of aircrew mental workload. Human Factors, 
1979,21 (5),549-574. 
44 
APPENDICES 
45 
This Page Intentionally Left Blank 
APPENDIX A 
PREFLIGHT QUESTIONNAIRE DATA 
Flight Experience of Subject Pilots 
(Time in hours) 
Instrument 
Total Instrument Time Time in 
Pilots Flight Time Flight Time Last 6 Mos. Aztec/Apache 
1 1550 130 22 7 
2 935 75 1.5 14 
3 350 20 10 13 
4 450 50 0 0 
5 1700 225 25 20 
6 1000 170 20 0 
7 7000 1000 5 0 
8 500 50 25 0 
Average 1685.6 215.0 13.6 6.8 
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APPENDIX B 
PREFLIGHT QUESTIONNAIRE DATA 
IFR Responses 
When flying with a qualified instrument pilot as copilot, how do you use 
his services? 
Activity 
Radio Work (communications) 
Navigation/Charts 
Flap/Gear Operation 
Check List 
Flight Procedures 
Does having a copilot on an I FR flight: 
Make th~ flight easier? 
Reduce the workload? 
Make the flight safer? 
Yes 
7 
6 
7 
What is the most difficult aspect of single-pilot IF R flight? 
Missed Approach 
Approach Planning/Procedures 
Traffic Observation 
High Density Area Operations 
Workload 
Take-Off & Climb Procedures 
Chart Handling 
Number 
7 
3 
2 
1 
1 
Number 
Number 
2 
2 
No 
1 
2 
Pilots 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Average 
Rating 
APPENDIX C 
WORKLOAD RATINGS BY SUBJECT PILOTS 
AT COMPLETION OF EACH FLIGHT 
10= very heavy workload 
5 = moderate workload 
0= light workload 
(Values shown are averages of ratings 
for the I LS, VOR, NDB and ASR 
approaches comprising each flight.) 
Flights 
FDC used as Single-
Copilot memory aid pilot 
A B C 
5.25 5.0 4.0 
4.75 6.75 6.5 
3.67 5.0 4.75 
6.0 4.25 4.75 
5.5 5.0 5.0 
5.3 5.0 4.0 
6.87 5.67 6.0 
4.0 4.75 1.0 
5.17 5.18 4.5 
FDC/ATC 
interactive 
D 
3.12 
2.0 
4.5 
5.5 
5.0 
5.0 
5.75 
1.0 
3.98 
49 
50 
Pilots 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Average 
Ranking 
APPENDIX D 
WORKLOAD RANKINGS BY SUBJECT PILOTS 
AT COMPLETION OF ALL FLIGHTS 
Copilot 
A 
4 
2 
4 
4 
3 
2 
4 
3 
3.25 
4 = lightest workload 
1 = heaviest workload 
Flights 
FDC used as 
memory aid 
B 
1 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
1 
2.0 
Single-
pilot 
C 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
4 
1 
2 
2.0 
Friedman's non-parametric test: T=7.8; df=3; p=.05. 
The null hypothesis is rejected (p=.05). 
FDC/ATC 
interactive 
D 
3 
4 
3 
3 
2 
4 
3 
4 
3.25 
There is a significant difference among the flights in the workload 
judged to be imposed. Flight A (use of copilot) and Flight D (use 
of Flight Data Console interactive with Air Traffic Control) are 
considered to have a reduced workload as compared to Flights B 
and C. 
Pilots 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Average 
Ranking 
APPENDIX E 
SAFETY RANKINGS BY SUBJECT PILOTS 
AT COMPLETION OF ALL FLIGHTS 
Copilot 
A 
4 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3.87 
4 = most safe 
1 = least safe 
Flights 
FOC used as 
memory aid 
B 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
3 
1 
2.0 
Single-
pilot 
C 
3 
2 
1 
2 
4 
2 
1 
3 
2.25 
Friedman's non-parametric test: T=10.65; df=3; p=0.02. 
FOC/ATC 
interactive 
0 
3 
4 
3 
1 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2.62 
The null hypothesis is rejected (p<'05). There is a significant 
difference among the flights in their judged safeness. Obviously, 
Flight A (use of copilot) is considered to be safer than the other 
three. 
51 
52 
Pilots 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Average 
Ranking 
APPENDIX F 
ACCEPTANCE RAN KINGS BY SUBJECT PILOTS 
AT COMPLETION OF ALL FLIGHTS 
Copilot 
A 
4 
2 
4 
4 
4 
2 
4 
2 
3.25 
4 = most preferred 
1 = least preferred 
Flights 
FOC used as 
memory aid 
B 
1 
1 
2 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1.6 
Single-
pilot 
C 
3 
3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
3 
2.5 
Friedman's non-parametric test: T=6.45; df=3; p=.09. 
FOC/ATC 
interactive 
0 
2 
4 
3 
1 
1 
3 
3 
4 
2.6 
The null hypothesis is accepted (p<.05). There is no statistical 
difference among the flights in terms of pilot acceptance. An 
inspection of the totals, however, shows a tendency for Flight B 
(use of Flight Data Console as a memory aid) to be somewhat 
less preferred than the remaining three flights. 
ASR 
ASRS 
ATC 
ATIS 
DAAS 
DABS 
DH 
FDC 
IFR 
ILS 
MDA 
NDB 
VFR 
VHF 
VOR 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Airport Surveillance Radar 
Aviation Safety Reporting System 
Air Traffic Control 
Automatic Terminal Information Service 
Demonstration Advanced Avionics System 
Discrete Address Beacon System 
Decision Height 
Flight Data Console 
Instrument Flight Rules 
Instrument Landing System 
Minimum Descent Altitude 
Non-Directional Radio Beacon 
Visual Flight Rules 
Very High Frequency 
Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range 
53 
1. Report No. 12. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No. 
NASA CR-3461 
4. Title and Subtitle 5. Report Date 
A FLIGHT INVESTIGATION OF SHmLATED DATA-LINK August 1981 
COMMUNICATIONS DURING SINGLE-PILOT IFR FLIGHT - 6. Performing Organization Code 
VOLUME I - EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND INITIAL TESTS 
7. Author(s) 8. Performing Organization Report No. 
James F. Parker, Jr., Jack W. Duffy, and 
Diane G. Christensen 10. Work Unit No. 
9. Performing Organization Name and Address 
BioTechnology, Inc. 
3027 Rosemary Lane 11. Contract or Grant No. 
Falls Church, Virginia 22042 NASl-l6037 
13. Type of Report and Period Covered 
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address Contractor Report National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Washington, D.C. 20546 14. Sponsoring Agency Code 
15. Supplementary Notes 
Langley Technical Monitor: Hugh P. Bergeron. 
Final Report 
16. Abstract 
A Flight Data Console (FDC) was developed to allow simulation of a 
digital communications link to replace the current voice communication 
system used in Air Traffic Control. The voice system requires 
manipulation of radio equipment, read-back of clearances, and mental 
storage of critical information items, all contributing to high workload, 
particularly during single-pilot operations. This was an inflight 
study to determine how a digital communications system might reduce 
cockpit workload, improve flight proficiency, and be accepted by general 
aviation pilots. 
Results show that instrument flight, including approach and 
landing, can be accomplished quite effectively using a digital data 
link system for ATC communications. Workload for single-pilot flight, 
using the FDC, matched that found when a qualified copilot was present. 
Comments by subject pilots identified a number of human factors issues 
(placement, size, message format, etc. ) which influence the 
acceptance of a digital system. 
17. Key Words (Suggested by Author(s" 18. Distribution Statement 
Flight displays 
General aviation Unclassified - Unlimited 
Air traffic control 
Subject Category 04 
19. Security Classif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21. No. of Pages 22. Price 
Unclassified Unclassified 60 A04 
For sale by the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161 
NASA-Langley, i9S! 
End of Document 
